


# Media and Information Literacy Unit Plan for High School Level

.....

**COUNTERING DISINFORMATION IN THE  
ELECTORAL PROCESS AND PROMOTING YOUTH  
ENGAGEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE  
CARIBBEAN**



## Legal

---

Published in 2022 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 7, place de Fontenoy, 75352 Paris 07 SP, France and UNESCO's Regional Bureau for Science in Latin America and the Caribbean, UNESCO Montevideo, Luis Piera 1992, 2nd floor, Montevideo, 11200, Uruguay.

© UNESCO 2022

MTD/CI/2022/PI/01



This publication is available in Open Access under the Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 IGO license (CC BY-SA 3.0 IGO) (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/igo/>). By using the content of this publication, the users accept to be bound by the terms of use of the UNESCO Open Access Repository ([www.unesco.org/open-access/terms-use-ccbysa-sp](http://www.unesco.org/open-access/terms-use-ccbysa-sp)).

The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of UNESCO concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

The ideas and opinions expressed in this work are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of UNESCO and do not commit the Organization.

Managing Editor: Sandra Sharman

Graphic Design: Juan Pablo Caruso

The Chequeado team developed this guide.

Authors: Julieta Schisano, Laura Zommer, Milena Rosenzvit



# Introduction



In 2020 Chequeado worked together with [UNESCO](#) in the development of [PortalCheck](#). This platform offers Media and Information Literacy (MIL) and fact-checking resources (see box below the introduction) for different audiences in Latin America and the Caribbean: journalists, social media content creators (influencers), institutions and governments, teachers/professors, and citizens in general. The platform offers audiences different types of content, from tools to check information and advice on how to avoid spreading disinformation to articles that debunk the most common pieces of fake news across the region. So far, these tools have mainly focused on COVID-19.

Inspired by PortalCheck, [UNESCO](#) and [Chequeado](#) have embarked on a new initiative to tackle disinformation during electoral processes in Latin America and the Caribbean called **PortalCheck Elecciones**. The initiative is funded by UNESCO's Multi-Donor Programme (MDP). The portal offers a series of resources to support the counter against disinformation around electoral processes.

This document presents a **unit plan** for teachers to work on disinformation in electoral contexts in the classroom, as adolescents are a crucial part of public debates, and in several countries, they can even exercise their right to vote.

Although it is expected that the contents of disinformation may vary over time and from country to country (and at subnational levels), some elements are common throughout the region and in all electoral periods. We recommend addressing these elements in the classroom as a strategy to mitigate the mass circulation of such content and to encourage young people to make informed decisions, a challenge that, of course, adults also face.

All of us at [Chequeado's Education Program](#) know that schools in general and teachers, in particular, can promote participation and encourage the **development of critical thinking skills** so that, when voting, young people do so based on verified information. We believe that teaching these skills in schools, especially the skills needed to identify disinformation, as part of **Media and Information Literacy (MIL)** is crucial to strengthen the democratic system. [UNESCO](#) also recognizes that disinformation and Media and Information Literacy are particularly critical in electoral periods, as stated in the 2019 [Election and Media in Digital Times](#) report, which addresses how the problem of disinformation impacts, affects, and disrupts electoral processes around the world. Thus, [UNESCO's Media and Information Literacy \(MIL\) Alliance](#) is leading an innovative effort to promote international cooperation to make sure all citizens have access to media and information literacy competencies for people to become engaged citizens and responsible decision-makers. [Annex 1](#) for teachers offers MIL resources and materials developed by [UNESCO](#).

## Introduction

Media and Information Literacy Unit Plan for High School Level

Some of the skills we want students to learn and that we prioritize in this unit plan are:

- Differentiate between facts, data, and opinions.
- Recognize standard features of viral disinformation in electoral contexts.
- Assess the reliability of a source based on a set of criteria.
- Identify the context in which a given image or text was first published.

These skills must be acquired; they do not come naturally. We need strategies to teach them in educational institutions and other settings because we are aware that merely expressing them is insufficient.

In short, this unit provides exercises to support young people improve their ability to select candidates, vote in an informed manner, and take part in public debates. We hope that, as a teacher, you will find this program and resources helpful and that we stay in touch to continue strengthening and building critical and active citizenship together. Please fill out this [form](#) if you are interested in receiving more of Chequeado's resources and educational plans.



UNESCO defines **Media and Information Literacy (MIL)** as a set of competencies that empower citizens to access, analyze, interpret, understand, evaluate, use, create and disseminate information and multimedia content in all formats, using different tools, in a critical, ethical and creative manner.

**Fact-checking or verification journalism** is a branch of journalism that aims to identify fake or misleading viral content and analyze relevant statements made by public figures (such as politicians, social leaders, business leaders, among others) that are subject to verification (i.e., that contain factual elements). As part of their work, fact-checking organizations make all data and sources available to the public so that each person can independently verify any given content.



## What do we want students to learn throughout the program?

### Learning objectives

	Skills	Topics
Class 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Distinguish between official and unofficial sources of information to access relevant and verified content on the elections and the health measures to be implemented in the context of the pandemic.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How electoral systems work and their relevance for democracy.</li> <li>In many cases, the health measures adopted by each country or sub-national jurisdiction in the context of the pandemic will affect the electoral procedures.</li> <li>Elections are governed by official bodies, who communicate through different channels, which we will call "official sources."</li> </ul>
Class 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identify recurring themes in the disinformation circulating in the electoral context.</li> <li>Group content into categories based on the characteristics that recur in the context of elections.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Disinformation is the fake or misleading content circulating in the media, messaging services and social media.</li> <li>The spread of viral, fake or misleading content is dangerous because it threatens democracy and public health.</li> <li>Disinformation increases in electoral periods around the world; and there are different types of "common" disinformation circulating in this context in Latin America and the Caribbean.</li> </ul>
Class 3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Distinguish factual from non-factual content (such as opinions, beliefs or promises).</li> <li>Use various search tools to locate references to the publication's location and time.</li> <li>Search for information to contrast the content of potential disinformation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There are different approaches citizens can put into practice to mitigate disinformation.</li> </ul>

# Class 1

Activity	Description	Duration
1	Present class program and objectives.	15 minutes
2	Compilation of questions: discuss some critical questions about exercising the right to vote.	30 minutes
3	We seek solutions to these questions through cooperating.	25 minutes
4	Strategies for selecting sources of information.	10 minutes



[Annex 1:](#) For teachers, there are “official” reference sources that offer details on each country’s voting processes in the area that are relevant to this topic.

## ACTIVITY 1:

### Present class program and learning objectives

Duration: 15 minutes.

We suggest the teacher begins the program with a general overview of the classes and their learning objectives, stressing the importance of the right to vote and the value of everyone’s participation in strengthening democracy. It is crucial to highlight that by voting, we not only elect authorities but can also have a say in the type of country we want. Elections seek to ensure that citizens’ voices are heard and that their interests are represented in the public debate and formulation of public policies. For this reason, it is crucial to point out that it is essential to exercise this right in an informed manner to be able to choose autonomously.

We also suggest indicating the date of the upcoming elections and which positions are being voted on without going into detail, as this will be discussed more in-depth in the program’s activities.

## ACTIVITY 2:

### Compilation of questions and sources of information

Duration: 30 minutes.

After providing background information, the students, working in pairs or groups, **formulate six questions that they consider essential for exercising the right to vote in an informed manner.** The questions should address how the electoral system and the different powers work (their functions and boundaries), the voting procedure, and the measures that will be implemented in their country in the context of the pande-

## Class 1

### Media and Information Literacy Unit Plan for High School Level

mic to comply with public health requirements during the elections, among other topics. We suggest that students have **15 minutes to formulate their questions in writing**.

Students could ask questions such as:

- Who may vote?
- What documents or IDs are valid for voting?
- Where can I vote, or how can I find out where?
- What is the voting procedure like?

They will then spend another 15 minutes sharing the questions they came up with. We suggest encouraging discussion through the following questions:

- What criteria did you use to select the questions?
- Did everyone agree on the decision?
- Would you add any other questions?

At the end of this activity, the teacher can add any additional questions they deem relevant for students to reflect on electoral processes. Finally, the group will come up with a **compilation of questions** on which we will focus on in the following activities.

Below we share some questions that we consider relevant, and that can be incorporated if they were not suggested in the previous activity. The teacher can add or eliminate questions as they see fit.

- Are there internal or primaries elections? What are their characteristics?
- Is the legislature bicameral or unicameral?
- How is the legislative power formed?
- How long are the terms of the legislative branch?
- Can delegates, senators, and representatives run for re-election?
- At what age can representatives, senators, and delegates hold legislative office?
- What system is used to vote for members of the legislative branch? Are the list closed lists or can I choose candidates from each list?
- What system is used to vote for President?
- How long does a President last in office? Can the President be re-elected?
- Can I cross-vote? What is the procedure like?

**ACTIVITY 3:**

Working collaboratively, we look for answers to these questions

Duration: 25 minutes


When we look for information, we usually find different sources: the words of a doctor, of a journalist, the comments of our relatives or teachers, government sites, the social media profiles of public figures, and the websites of non-governmental organizations or foundations, among others.

We ask students to answer the compilation of questions they put together in the previous activity without giving them any indications about the search criteria so as not to condition their choices. For each question, they must include the sources of information from which they draw their answers.

To match all the questions and answers with their sources, we suggest handing out post-its or sheets of paper to the students and then pasting them on a poster board, flip chart, white or blackboard. Also, if computers are available at the school, you can work on a collaborative document on the Padlet platform (or any other similar platform available). Although it is pretty intuitive to use, you can search for tutorials on [YouTube](#).

In both cases, students must include the source(s) from which they obtained the information for all of their answers.

Below we share an image as an example. This can be useful for the digital collaborative document option and the written questions and answers on paper or poster.



List of questions – electoral process

- Who can vote?
- What are the types of valid ID to vote?
- Where do I vote? How can I find out?
- What's the process like to cast a vote?
- Other questions

You can find a Padlet example [here](#).



**ACTIVITY 4:**  
**Strategies for selecting sources of information**  
**Duration: 10 minutes**

At the end of this class, we suggest discussing the following questions with the whole group:

- What criteria did you use to select the sources of information to answer your questions?
- On what basis did you discard any sources?
- Was there any disagreement about the sources selected or discarded?
- What do the sources of information chosen to answer the election questions have in common?

We suggest the teacher focuses on the different types of content that circulate in social and mass media, stressing that, in the case of elections, it is important to refer to the legally valid sources that report on the procedures and measures adopted. For example, suppose we want to know which document is valid for voting. In that case, the sources that will provide legally accurate information are the official sites or those that refer to the regulations in force.

Based on this, we suggest having an entire group debate the sources of information the different groups selected to answer the questions about the electoral system.

- Do the sources selected mention the regulations in force?  
Are the selected sources public or private?
- What are the characteristics of the URL? (Does it include a .gov, .com, or acronyms that refer to information from our country, among others).
- Do you think you should select other sources of information to answer any of the questions? Why?

Suppose students answered using information from sources that, after the group discussion, they consider are not the most appropriate. In that case, we suggest they search again and remind them that the most appropriate sites to gather information on electoral procedures are the official sites.



In [Annex 1](#) for the teacher, we include a list of official sites that provide electoral information from different countries in the region as reference material.

## Class 2

Activity	Description	Duration
1	Fake or misleading information: Disinformation and its implications. Sharing students' previous knowledge about this topic. Discuss some examples.	20 minutes
2	Disinformation in electoral contexts: identify and reflect on the different types of disinformation circulating in Latin America and the Caribbean.	60 minutes

Above we shared the general objectives for each class (topics and skills). Here we present them in more in-depth for the second session.

We want the students to:

- Recognize that there is fake or misleading content circulating in the media (such as television shows, radio, newspapers, and magazines, among others), social media (Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, among others), and messaging services (WhatsApp, Telegram, among others) which we call "disinformation."
- Remember that disinformation increases during election times and that during these times, there are some "common" types of disinformation in Latin America and the Caribbean.
- Understand that the viral spread of fake content is dangerous for citizens because it can affect our democracy and public health.
- Know and classify different types of standard disinformation circulating during election periods in Latin America and the Caribbean.

### ACTIVITY 1:

#### False or misleading information

**Duration: 20 minutes**

In this first activity, we suggest sharing the students' daily experiences regarding the circulation of fake or misleading information. Below we provide some questions as triggers to start the conversation:

- Have you heard or received any content about these elections that seemed suspicious, misleading, or made you question its reliability?
- How did this information reach you? (WhatsApp, social or traditional media, friends, relatives, among others).

## Class 2

### Media and Information Literacy Unit Plan for High School Level

- What made you question the integrity of the content? (for example, the unknown source, the characteristics of the images, the account or person who issued the information, or the sound of an audio file).
- Finally, could you identify whether the content was genuine or fake? If you so, how did you find out? What resources did you use to do so?
- In the context of an election, the viral spread of fake content (disinformation) increases. Why do you think this happens?

## What do we call disinformation?

Once they have shared different experiences with fake or misleading information, we suggest explaining that these experiences are not isolated but generalized and that this is what we call “disinformation.”

Here are some examples:



Example showing images taken out of context.

Old pictures of the Tolosa Paz campaign were used as if they were current



Example of an audio that was falsely attributed to a certain person.

It is not true that “Chino” Navarro was caught on audio threatening farmers and calling them “thieves”

**Frases atribuidas a constituyentes de la Lista del Pueblo son falsas**



**Example showing false statements.**

Alleged quotes from Lista del Pueblo supporters not true.

We suggest that teachers explain to students that **disinformation** refers to fake or partly false content. Such content can be produced and disseminated intentionally or unintentionally. It circulates in different media, but especially in social media. It states things that did not happen, takes facts out of context, or twists them to change their meaning.

Finally, we can explain that, although “disinformation” refers to all of this type of content in Spanish, there is a distinction based on the intentionality behind such fake news in English. When fake information is shared unknowingly, without the intention to harm, we speak of “misinformation.” At the same time, “disinformation” implies the intent to deceive, often done in an organized, malicious, and systematic manner, where money is invested, and political or economic interests are behind. In Spanish, disinformation includes intentional content, content that does not have a deliberate intention, and content that was taken out of context.

In particular, we want students to identify the potential negative consequences and how it threatens democratic integrity and people’s rights.

If you want to share other examples of disinformation with your students, we suggest sharing checks or verifications made by fact-checking organizations in their home country. In this way, we avoid spreading disinformation even further, and students can see why what was said or published is not true in the fact-checked piece. In addition, the verifications carried out by these organizations usually provide links to data and sources so that audiences can verify the contents for themselves.

The box below shows a list of fact-checking organizations in Latin America certified by the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN), where we can check disinformation in each country with their corresponding verifications.

Country	Organization	Link
Argentina	Chequeado	<a href="https://chequeado.com/">https://chequeado.com/</a>
Bolivia	Bolivia Verifica	<a href="https://boliviaverifica.bo/">https://boliviaverifica.bo/</a>
Brazil	Estadao	<a href="https://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/estadao-verifica/">https://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/estadao-verifica/</a>
Brazil	Lupa	<a href="https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/lupa/">https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/lupa/</a>
Brazil	Aos Fatos	<a href="https://www.aosfatos.org/">https://www.aosfatos.org/</a>
Chile	Fast check	<a href="https://www.fastcheck.cl/">https://www.fastcheck.cl/</a>
Colombia	Colombia Check	<a href="https://colombiacheck.com/">https://colombiacheck.com/</a>
Colombia	La Silla Vacía	<a href="https://www.lasillavacia.com/la-silla-vacia/">https://www.lasillavacia.com/la-silla-vacia/</a>
Ecuador	Ecuador Chequea	<a href="http://www.ecuadorchequea.com/">http://www.ecuadorchequea.com/</a>
Mexico	Animal Político (El Sabueso)	<a href="https://www.animalpolitico.com/sabueso/">https://www.animalpolitico.com/sabueso/</a>
Peru	La República (Verificador)	<a href="https://larepublica.pe/verificador/">https://larepublica.pe/verificador/</a>
Regional	AFP	<a href="https://factual.afp.com/">https://factual.afp.com/</a>
Regional	EFE Verifica	<a href="https://verifica.efe.com/">https://verifica.efe.com/</a>
Venezuela	Cotejo	<a href="https://cotejo.info/">https://cotejo.info/</a>

## ACTIVITY 2:

### Disinformation in the context of an election

Duration: 60 minutes

Fake and misleading content increases significantly during election periods. And as we have seen, in Latin America and the Caribbean, there are different types of disinformation that we see over and over, that is, that are common in the region. In this first activity, we will not look for evidence to define whether a given piece of information is true or false; instead, we will identify and reflect on the **different types of disinformation that circulate in Latin America and the Caribbean around election times**. The objective is that if they find any content that matches these patterns, students will remember that there is usually a lot of disinformation around these topics or formats, and they can take a more critical look at them (next class, they will learn specific tools for verification).


## Class 2

### Media and Information Literacy Unit Plan for High School Level

To do this, we suggest they read the following pieces of disinformation. For the sake of time, we suggest students only work with the headlines and summary. In addition, [Annex 2](#) shows other examples of disinformation in an electoral context.

#### Los telegramas con errores no implican que haya habido fraude electoral

Por EQUIPO REVERSO - 14/08/2019



(2019 Elections - Argentina)

Mistakes in telegrams do not mean there has been electoral fraud

#### Frases atribuidas a constituyentes de la Lista del Pueblo son falsas



(2021 Elections - Chile)

Alleged quotes from Lista del Pueblo supporters not true

Martes, 14 Mayo 2019

#### No es cierto que todos los venezolanos puedan votar en elecciones de Colombia

Por Ana María Saavedra

Extranjeros pueden votar en elecciones locales en Colombia pero solo si tienen cédula de extranjería, llevan en el país cinco años o más y se inscriben para votar.

Tanto en redes sociales como en portales de noticias han difundido la información de que "venezolanos" pueden votar en las elecciones de Colombia.


Esto es Cuestionable pues solo algunos extranjeros (de Venezuela o de cualquier otro país), que cumplan con ciertos requisitos estrictos, pueden votar en Colombia y solo en algunas elecciones locales (no en las presidenciales ni en las legislativas).

(2019 Elections - Colombia)

It is not true all Venezuelan nationals can vote in Colombian elections

## Class 2

### Media and Information Literacy Unit Plan for High School Level



(2020 Elections - Bolivia)

Fake data on foreign vote outcome disseminated

After that, they can listen to the following episode of *El Podcast de Chequeado*, which, although it refers to the elections in Argentina, can be helpful for the whole region: "[What type of disinformation you need to watch out for during elections](#)" in which they discuss the most common types of disinformation during election times.

We then suggest the teacher **lists** the different types of disinformation mentioned in the podcast **on the blackboard or board** and in [Annex 2](#) to identify the common patterns around disinformation.

Based on this, students should match the news with the different types of disinformation listed on the board. This activity can be done in groups or with the entire class.

The idea is to fill out a table like the following and then match the examples shared above:

Type of disinformation	Example of disinformation
Minor irregularities in the electoral process are reported as fraud.	
Editing and manipulation of images, videos, audio, and TV headlines, among others.	
The fact that people who are deceased or not qualified to vote can vote.	
Disinformation about the documentation needed to vote or about election day.	
Disinformation deceives citizens so they do not vote or invalidate their vote.	
Disinformation about the right to vote for people who live abroad.	
Disinformation about fake polls.	
Disinformation about false declarations, statements, or fake publicity of candidates.	

## Class 3

Activity	Description	Duration
1	Differentiate factual content from non-factual content (such as opinions, beliefs, and promises).	20 minutes
2	Search for information that makes it possible to contrast the content of potential disinformation.	30 minutes
3	Identify the time and space aspects of any given content through different search tools.	20 minutes
4	Sequence wrap-up. Reflections and opinions about the work done in the three sessions.	10 minutes

Above we shared the general objectives of each lesson (topics and skills). During this third session, we look at them more in-depth.

We want the students to:

- Distinguish factual content from non-factual content (such as opinions, beliefs, and promises).
- Identify the time and space context of any given content through different search tools.
- Look for information to contrast the content of potential disinformation.

### ACTIVITY 1:

#### Factual and non-factual contents

**Duration: 20 minutes**

After having worked with the different types of disinformation that circulate in the electoral context in the region in session number 2, in this activity, we want students to understand that some **information can be considered either true or false, but other information cannot be analyzed or contrasted against data or evidence** (such as beliefs, promises, and opinions).



**The objective is for them to recognize that many statements and content are not just based on political points of view or positions, but can be defined as “true or false” according to their factual elements.** In fact, in the speeches of public figures, we often find assessments, proposals, opinions, or promises that may be somewhat subjective and express different approaches, ideas, or promises. At the same time, there are other elements in the discourse that go beyond our opinions and that we can verify whether they are true or false. We may also see that some statements are presented as objective facts when they are really expressing points of view or promises for the future.

To learn the difference, we propose working with the whole group, using the board, matching the following sentences, as appropriate, in the table below.

- “Dogs have two legs.”
- “Motorcycles are four-wheeled vehicles.”
- “Snow is white.”
- “Stealing is illegal.”
- “There are over 7 billion people in the world.”
- “Summer is better than winter.”
- “Chocolate chip mint is terrible.”
- “Shall we go for a run in the park?”

True	False	Not applicable
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● “Stealing is illegal.”</li> <li>● “There are over 7 billion people in the world.”</li> <li>● “Snow is white”.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● “Dogs have two legs.”</li> <li>● “Motorcycles are four-wheeled vehicles.”</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● “Summer is better than winter.”</li> <li>● “Chocolate chip mint is terrible.”</li> <li>● “Shall we go for a run in the square?.”</li> </ul>

As students complete the chart, they will see that some statements cannot be categorized as either true or false, not because we don’t have enough information, but because it doesn’t make sense to think of them that way. We can then tell them that these kinds of statements, which cannot be considered as either true or false, are grouped as non-factual because they do not refer to facts or data, while both true and false statements are grouped as factual elements. It is important

**Class 3**


## Media and Information Literacy Unit Plan for High School Level

to stress that a factual element is not necessarily true. In fact, it is possible to detect that some statements are false precisely because, when contrasting their factual elements with evidence, we see that they do not match (if we count the dogs' legs, in general, there are 4).

Factual		Non-factual
True	False	Not applicable
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• "Stealing is illegal."</li> <li>• "There are over 7 billion people in the world."</li> <li>• "Snow is white".</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• "Dogs have two legs."</li> <li>• "Motorcycles are four-wheeled vehicles."</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• "Summer is better than winter."</li> <li>• "Chocolate chip mint is terrible."</li> <li>• "Shall we go for a run in the square?."</li> </ul>

In short, the aim of this exercise is to support students gain the ability to distinguish between information that is based on speaker's opinion and information that is based on fact. For example, it would make sense to evaluate whether the following comment would qualify as disinformation: *"Latin American governments should focus on the XXX problem"* since it is a personal opinion or a political stance and not the description of a fact that can be classified as "true" or "false." On the contrary, the statement "poverty has decreased by 20% in the last ten years" can be checked and could eventually be false, regardless of who says it, their political position, or whether we agree with it.

To review the conclusions of the previous activity, we suggest students watch [this video](#) (from the beginning to 0.46 seconds), where they explain the difference between factual content and content based on opinions, beliefs, and promises.



### Class 3

#### Media and Information Literacy Unit Plan for High School Level

Based on what they have reviewed, we suggest students, individually or in pairs, look for two Tweets or statements made by current national political public figures or experts and identify the factual elements in those statements. For example, they could look for comments made by the candidates running for election.

Here are two examples:

#### Example 1

*"We must have elections with a public vote counting. We cannot have half a dozen people counting the votes in a secret room".*

**Statement by Jair Bolsonaro - August 12th, 2021**

Source: <https://www.aosfatos.org/todas-as-declara%C3%A7%C3%B5es-de-bolsonaro/>

It is interesting to analyze Jair Bolsonaro's statements with the students and have them identify the factual from the non-factual elements to detect possible disinformation. The Brazilian President makes a proposal for the elections: "We must have elections with a public vote counting." This can be analyzed as a political opinion and position. However, he also introduces a factual element in his statement: "half a dozen people counting the votes in a secret room." This can be checked since it is not a personal opinion but a fact that can be true or false.

#### Example 2

In this second example, we can analyze the following statement made on Twitter by Luis Alberto Arce, President of Bolivia.

*"I received the credential that appoints me as President-elect of the Plurinational State of Bolivia. I ratify my commitment to work and love for my country. Thanks to the Bolivian people for their trust."*

**Luis Alberto Arce - October 28th, 2020**

Source: <https://twitter.com/luchoxbolivia/status/1321482329282498561?lang=es>

This statement by the President of Bolivia, Luis Arce, is also an excellent example of the distinction between factual and non-factual statements.

The political leader's "commitment to work" and "love for the country" are opinions or political positions. We cannot contrast these statements against concrete data or facts.

### Class 3

#### Media and Information Literacy Unit Plan for High School Level

It is impossible to measure or confirm “commitment” or “love,” and therefore it is impossible to verify this statement. However, we can check the part where he states that he received the credential that qualifies him as President of the country since it does not depend on a personal opinion but on a fact that can be true or false.

We suggest wrapping up the activity reflecting on the contents and concepts addressed, focusing on the following aspects:

- What we call “disinformation” refers to the fake or misleading content circulating in traditional and social media.
- Although we distinguish facts from opinions, the latter are not less important but are different types of narrative, and they both require different types of analysis.
- There are common elements to the different types of disinformation circulating at the regional level, increasing during election periods.
- Citizens need to tap into different skills to detect and reduce disinformation. One of them is to be able to distinguish, regardless of the type of content, statement, or discourse, factual elements (referring to facts, evidence, data) from non-factual elements (opinions, promises, beliefs).
- The viral spread of fake content is dangerous for citizens because it can threaten our democracy and health.

### ACTIVITY 2:

#### Contrast information

Duration: 30 minutes.

In this activity, students should contrast the information provided in the following statement with data from different sources. They should define whether the statements below are true or false in their country, justifying their decision with the source of information used to determine their answer.



Juana read on Instagram that the lists of candidates for the Legislative Branch should be made up of half women and half men.



Maria saw on a Facebook post that any ID card or document with a personal photo is valid to vote.



A friend of Juan’s told him via WhatsApp that in his country you can vote as of the age of 18.



Lucas saw a sign on the public road that read: “This year in our country we vote with electronic voting.”

### Class 3

#### Media and Information Literacy Unit Plan for High School Level



Walter heard a journalist say that in our country we have a unicameral legislature.



A neighbor told Antonella that in her country there are penalties for those who do not vote.

### ACTIVITY 3:

#### Reverse image search

Duration: 20 minutes.

As discussed in the previous activity, disinformation often results from associating a picture, video, audio file, or document with a given time or space that does not correspond to the moment it was taken or created. Content is spread as if those pictures or files were published or happened on a certain date and place, but in reality, they happened on a different date or in another place.

The purpose of this activity is for students to check if a picture, video, audio file, or document corresponds to the time and space context they are associated with.

We suggest showing the students a piece of news containing an image that does not correspond with the date reported since the image has been tampered with or distorted with digital elements.



Guillermo Lasso allegedly received one of the 8000 shots

<https://ecuadorverifica.org/2021/02/19/imagen-de-guillermo-lasso-siendo-vacunado-contra-el-covid-19-es-un-montaje/>

We also suggest sharing the following piece of disinformation that shows a video circulated during the Mexican elections, which does not correspond to the reported context.

### Class 3

#### Media and Information Literacy Unit Plan for High School Level



Video of ballots marked in favor of Morena are not current, they date back to 2018 – taken out of context

<https://www.animalpolitico.com/elsabueso/video-boletas-morena-macuspansa-fraude-elecciones-2021-2018/>

#### How can we determine the date a picture was taken?

To work on the skills needed to check whether an image matches the text with which it is associated, we are doing a “step-by-step reverse image search.”

- 1) First, they must search online for an image associated with a news item. Then right-click on the image and choose “Google image search.”

#### ANIMALES

### Dos delfines aparecen en los canales de Venecia durante el nuevo confinamiento

ANDREA FISCHER - 7 ABRIL, 2021



Dolphins spotted in Venice canals during new lockdown

<https://www.ngenespanol.com/animales/dos-delfines-aparecen-en-los-canales-de-venecia-durante-el-nuevo-confinamiento/>

- 2) Second, we need to look for its publication date to identify whether the image matches the context. To do this, we need to go to “tools” and filter the pictures according to the corresponding publication date. To see other reverse image search tools, we suggest reading [this](#) Chequeado article.

Finally, we suggest having an exchange (discussion) to share the work done, doubts, and any difficulties they may have had and check if any of them found misleading content due to the images being taken out of context.

**Duration: 10 minutes.**

- Do these activities help you feel more confident to exercise your right to vote in an informed way?
- Do you think you now have more tools to better inform yourself?
- What would you like to learn more about?

This can be done on a poster/board with post-its or sheets of paper or using free online tools.

[illegible]

# Proposed assessment for students

Conduct an assessment so teachers and students can discuss the topics and skills learned and those that still need more work.

The idea is that, based on the general objectives and skills addressed throughout the sessions, the students can **define what they learned, what obstacles they came across along the way, and what content they believe they still need or want to continue working on.**

Thus, after the self-assessment, we consider it essential to allow for a discussion to address any topics students feel are still pending or any questions that may have arisen due to curiosity and their desire to continue learning.

We suggest handing each student the objectives table so they can fill out the columns on the right and report what they learned, the obstacles they encountered in the learning process, and what they still need to continue working on.

For this, we suggest reviewing the activities carried out and the general objectives of the sessions.

We suggest that this activity be done individually.<sup>a</sup>

	What I learned	Obstacles I found	What I need to keep working on
Class 1			
Class 2			
Class 3			





# For the teacher:

## What was it like implementing this unit/program at school?

We encourage you to fill out this [form](#) to learn about your experience implementing this program.

Your contribution will help us create a more helpful and valuable experience. Thank you!

If you have any questions or suggestions, you can also reach us at:  
[educacion@chequeado.com](mailto:educacion@chequeado.com)



# Annex 1

Unit plan: “Electoral disinformation and youth participation in Latin America and the Caribbean.”

In this annex, you will find:

- UNESCO resources and publications on Media and Information Literacy (MIL).
- Resources and documents of interest on the electoral system in the different countries of Latin America.
- Resources and documents of interest from Chequeado on disinformation and Media and Information Literacy.

## UNESCO resources and documents on Media and Information Literacy (MIL).

- Curriculum for Teachers on Media and Information Literacy.  
<https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000216099?posInSet=1&queryId=-4d67a28b-1dee-4d6a-b136-277dab6f6615>
- “Think Critically, Click Wisely! Media and Information Literate Citizens”. Second edition of UNESCO’s Media Information Literacy curriculum for educators and students. <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000377068>
- Infodemic at school: classroom activities. Printable booklet.  
<https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000373628?posInSet=2&queryId=a-6bf5813-5cf3-483a-878f-25c493fcce23>
- Infodemic at school: resources for teachers on coronavirus and disinformation.  
<https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000373627>
- The global alliance for partnerships on media and information literacy (GAMPIL). Promoting Media and Information Literacy (MIL) as a Means to Open and Inclusive Development. [https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/gampil\\_framework\\_and\\_plan\\_of\\_action\\_10092019.pdf](https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/gampil_framework_and_plan_of_action_10092019.pdf)
- Understanding Media and Information Literacy (MIL) in the digital age. A question of democracy.  
[https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/gmw2019\\_understanding\\_mil\\_ulla\\_carlsson.pdf](https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/gmw2019_understanding_mil_ulla_carlsson.pdf)
- Elections and Media in Digital Times.  
<https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000371486>
- Global Media and Information Literacy (MIL) Assessment Framework: Country Readiness and Competencies. <http://uis.unesco.org/sites/default/files/documents/global-media-and-information-literacy-assessment-framework-country-readiness-and-competencies-2013-en.pdf>

## Annex 1

### Media and Information Literacy Unit Plan for High School Level

- Media and Information Literacy. Policy & Strategy Guidelines.  
<https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000225606>
- Media and Information Literacy (MIL) for Teachers.  
<http://unesco.mil-for-teachers.unaoc.org/>
- ¿What is UNESCO's Media Information Literacy Alliance?  
<https://es.unesco.org/themes/media-and-information-literacy/gapmil>
- The MIL CLICKS Social Media Initiative. <https://en.unesco.org/milclicks>
- Global Media and Information Literacy Week organized by UNESCO and members of the UNESCO Media and Information Literacy Alliance.  
<https://es.unesco.org/commemorations/globalmilweek>
- ¿What is MIL, according to UNESCO? <https://iite.unesco.org/mil/>

Resources and documents of interest on the electoral system in the different countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.

Organizations by country	Resources/documents
Argentina	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">National Electoral Chamber</a></li><li>• <a href="#">National Electoral Office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs</a></li></ul>
Bolivia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Supreme Electoral Board</a></li></ul>
Brazil	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Supreme Electoral Board</a></li></ul>
Chile	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Electoral Service</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Election Review Board</a></li></ul>
Colombia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">National Electoral Council</a></li><li>• <a href="#">National Civil Registration Office</a></li></ul>
Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Supreme Electoral Board</a></li></ul>
Cuba	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">National Electoral Council</a></li></ul>
Ecuador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">National Electoral Council Electoral Disputes Tribunal</a></li></ul>

**Annex 1**

## Media and Information Literacy Unit Plan for High School Level

El Salvador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">Supreme Electoral Board</a></li> </ul>
Guatemala	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">Supreme Electoral Board</a></li> </ul>
Honduras	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">Supreme Electoral Board</a></li> </ul>
Mexico	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">National Electoral Institute</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">Electoral Board of the Federal Justice System</a></li> </ul>
Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">Supreme Electoral Council</a></li> </ul>
Panama	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">Electoral Board</a></li> </ul>
Paraguay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">Supreme Electoral Justice Board</a></li> </ul>
Peru	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">National Electoral Process Office National Election Panel</a></li> </ul>
Dominican Republic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">Central Electoral Board</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">Supreme Electoral Board (TSE)</a></li> </ul>
Uruguay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">Electoral Court</a></li> </ul>
Venezuela	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">National Electoral Council</a></li> </ul>
Other useful websites for Latin America and the Caribbean (regional or international).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">IDEA Internacional Ace Project</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">International Foundation for Electoral Systems</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">Center for Electoral Assistance and Promotion (CAPEL). Specialized program of the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights (IIDH).<a href="https://www.iidh.ed.cr/capel/capel">https://www.iidh.ed.cr/capel/capel</a></a></li> <li>• <a href="#">Inter-American Union of Electoral Organizations (UNIORE)</a></li> </ul>

Additional Chequeado resources on disinformation and MIL:

- Five tips to avoid disinformation (video): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dd5ry2YizkQ>
- How to recognize a fake picture - Reverso: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jBAVhCCjz-7g&ab\\_channel=ReversoAr](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jBAVhCCjz-7g&ab_channel=ReversoAr)
- Five tips to avoid sharing fake news - Reverso: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4a1s6x-22jH8&ab\\_channel=ReversoAr](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4a1s6x-22jH8&ab_channel=ReversoAr)
- Can it be checked or not: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fw6QM6OUPBQ&ab\\_channel=-Chequeado](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fw6QM6OUPBQ&ab_channel=-Chequeado)
- Preventing and curing the Infodemic on fake news: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1m5fDkZ2ZEc>
- Infodemic: How to spot fake content? [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oUrPH-Fa3s8&ab\\_channel=Chequeado](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oUrPH-Fa3s8&ab_channel=Chequeado)
- Teacher training Mooc: "Teaching and learning about the pandemic: classroom strategies."
- The Infodemic at school. Resources for teachers on coronavirus and disinformation. [https:// chequeado.com/infodemiaenlaescuela/](https://chequeado.com/infodemiaenlaescuela/)

.....

## Annex 2

Unit plan: “Electoral disinformation and youth participation in Latin America and the Caribbean.”

### **The ten most common types of disinformation around election times in Latin America.**

*Cases compiled by Chequeado based on the LatamChequea network information for Portal Check.*

#### **1) The fact that there are some irregularities in the electoral process does not mean that there is fraud**

It is common for certain errors or even irregularities to occur within an electoral process involving millions of people. The type of irregularities depends on the electoral system of each country—in many cases, these include errors in the preliminary vote counting taking place at polling stations—but this type of disinformation is common in many electoral processes in the region, such as in [Argentina](#), [Peru](#) or [Colombia](#), where these errors are reported as evidence of alleged organized fraud.

Intentional irregularities do not systematically favor any party, while intentional irregularities tend to skew the results in favor of one party. However, there are mechanisms to assess transparency in an election and determine whether these irregularities are just simple errors or intentional manipulations. A mistake during elections is not proof of fraud.

In Argentina, for example, in the 2019 presidential elections, several images of the telegrams (used for the preliminary vote count on election night and which have no legal validity) with errors or inconsistencies, such as erased or erroneous sums, [circulated](#) as alleged evidence of fraud. However, the only valid result is the one reported days after in the vote counting official reports, signed by the voting station authorities and party monitors. If errors are detected, ballots may be opened for a new count.

Something similar happened in the 2018 presidential elections in Colombia, where images of crossed-out sections of the voting forms [circulated](#). However, the electoral body investigated these facts and reported that the irregularities accounted for less than 0.5% of the votes.

#### **2) Reports of an alleged fraud organized by the authorities**

This type of disinformation, together with the allegations of irregularities during the electoral processes, are usually among the most common during elections and attempts to prove an organized fraud arranged by national, local, and electoral authorities.

The case of Brazil is especially serious because the President himself, Jair Bolsonaro, reported an alleged electoral fraud in the 2018 elections (which he won) as part of his campaign, using [fake information](#). The claim that ballots had been tampered with was the [most widely disseminated](#) piece of [disinformation](#) in that year’s election campaign.

Another example of this was the case of Mexico, where [several posts](#) on social media claimed that the pens provided by the electoral body could be erased with fire.

Other types of disinformation that often circulate are linked to the electoral ballots (in countries that have this system): for example, that [fake ballots](#) are distributed, [that ballots were already marked](#) by a candidate on election day, that [there are ballots with fake colors](#) in the ballot boxes, or that previously opened electoral packages with missing ballots [are delivered](#).

### **3) Some people could use a deceased person's ID card to vote**

Another type of disinformation that is quite popular in elections in the region reports that voter registries [include](#) deceased persons or that other people use the identity cards of deceased persons to vote. However, these are often errors in the registries that the authorities correct.

During this year's elections in Peru, a video [circulated](#) showing a voting certificate that a deceased person supposedly signed. However, it was a typing error: the user had mistyped the last digit of their ID card—9 instead of 4.

In Costa Rica, it [was announced](#) that it would be possible to vote with expired ID cards in the 2022 general elections due to the pandemic. It was mistakenly reported that this would allow thousands of deceased persons to vote. But this is also false since the voters' registry is updated until the very same day of the election to make sure the names of those who have passed before that date are removed.

### **4) Ineligible persons could vote**

A lot of the content that circulates around the election period targets minorities. For example, reports claiming that immigrants are going to vote in the elections, in countries where it is not allowed, or, in countries where foreigners are allowed to vote, they will do so without complying with specific legal requirements.

This type of fake news varies according to the regulations of each country. For example, in Colombia, rumors [were spread](#) claiming that Venezuelans could vote in the 2019 elections. However, according to the country's regulations, immigrants can only vote if they hold a foreign resident ID card, have been in the country for five years or more, and are registered to vote. In other words, Venezuelans can indeed vote in Colombian elections (just as any other foreigner in the country), but only if they meet these requirements.

Something similar happened in Chile, where disinformation claimed that foreigners who had arrived less than a month ago [were allowed to vote](#) in the referendum for the New Constitution, even though in Chile, only foreigners who have lived in the country for more than five years can vote.

## **5) Fake news intended to mislead citizens so they do not vote or cast an invalid vote**

Each country has different rules that establish when a vote must be annulled or challenged (i.e., not counted as valid) and fake news seek to mislead citizens and cause them to annul their vote or not vote at all.

An example of this is a piece of news that [circulated](#) in Mexico claiming that it was possible to vote for more than one candidate, although doing this would, in fact, void the vote. Another example is a video that circulated in Colombia [stating](#) that if people had already voted for a certain candidate in the first round, they did not need to do so in the second round because the vote was already registered.

## **6) Desinformação sobre a documentação necessária para votar**

This type of misinformation spreads fake news about the types of documents accepted by the electoral bodies for voting.

During the pandemic, this type of disinformation took on new forms since many countries allowed voting with expired ID cards or documents, as it was difficult to renew them when social distancing measures were in force. However, in the referendum for a new Constitution in 2020 in Chile, fake content circulated [claiming](#) that it was impossible to vote with an expired ID card.

## **7) Disinformation about the voting rights of people who live abroad**

Another type of content that tends to circulate during election periods and whose regulation differs from country to country is the voting rights of citizens living abroad. For example, fake news was spread [claiming](#) that the Chilean embassy in Canada offered Chilean citizens the opportunity to vote in the referendum.

In Mexico, images of a pack of ballots sent to Mexicans abroad to vote in the elections went [viral](#), and accusations were made stating that the ballots for federal representatives were missing. However, Mexican legislation does not allow Mexicans living abroad to vote for all public offices, and it depends on the type of election and the State where they live.

In the 2020 elections in Bolivia, several [images](#) of the alleged foreign vote results went viral. These pictures even [carried the seal](#) of different international organizations such as the United Nations (UN).

## **8) Disinformation about Election Day**

This type of fake content seeks to confuse or instill fear in citizens about the time of the election, for example, by spreading the word that [people can vote](#) on certain days or at times that are not really authorized. In the last elections in Chile, the situation was incredibly confusing because while the October 2020 elections were held in only one day, the May 2021 elections were held in two.

Similar content circulated in Chile [stating](#) that there would be no safeguards in voting



stations or that they would be insecure. In Mexico, the news was spread stating that cell phones were [prohibited](#) in voting stations.

## **9) Disinformation about fake polls**

Most countries prohibit or specifically regulate the publication of election polls hours before Election Day and during Election Day.

However, it is common for fake content to circulate on those specific days imitating the layouts and formats of actual polls to announce fake results or trends to benefit one party. In Mexico's 2021 elections, an alleged exit poll on the results of the Governor election in the town of Sinaloa was [circulated](#) the very same day of the election. It even carried the logo of an official polling firm. However, this was fake: in Mexico, it is forbidden to publish polls while people are voting, and the polling firm denied issuing the study.

In the 2020 elections in Bolivia, an alleged exit poll with the logo of a Bolivian television channel [was circulated](#). According to the Bolivian Supreme Electoral Tribunal, exit polls can only be published after 6:00 p.m., the closing time of the voting stations. However, these results were published two hours earlier. The broadcaster denied authorship of the poll.

## **10) Disinformation about false declarations, statements, or fake publicity of candidates**

Another type of disinformation that is very common around the time of an election is fake news about electoral candidates. Photo editing and manipulation using editing software are widely used practices. Pictures are also taken out of context, as they may have been taken at a different time or place than the one reported. This can be used to show [supposed electoral publicity](#) that is fake.

The same happens with [fake images](#), for example, a montage that supposedly showed a presidential candidate in Ecuador being vaccinated at a time when only healthcare staff were being vaccinated. However, the picture was doctored.

Chyron or news tickers—the strips of text that appear at the bottom of the screen on news channels—are often used to report fake statements. Also, cards showing the logo of a media outlet and the photo of a candidate and their alleged statement. These types of resources are widely used to misinform because they are credible, easy to edit, and cheap. This happened with candidates in several countries, such as [Argentina](#) and [Chile](#). The same happens with fake [tweets](#), which are also easy to edit.

Videos that have been tampered with or taken out of context are also popular. For example, a video in Peru [was manipulated](#) to make it look like someone was dictating a speech to a presidential candidate.

Another widely used resource is satirical audio or audio falsely attributed to candidates. For example, in Argentina, audio [was circulated](#) in which a leader of an electoral party allegedly threatened farmers, but this was not true.

.....



Con el apoyo del  
Programa Multidonante de la UNESCO para la Libertad  
de Expresión y la Seguridad de los Periodistas



UNESCO's Regional Bureau for Science in Latin America and the Caribbean  
UNESCO Montevideo  
Luis Piera 1992, 2nd floor (MERCOSUR building) Montevideo 11200  
Phone + (598) 2413 2075  
Uruguay

---

[montevideo@unesco.org](mailto:montevideo@unesco.org)  
[www.unesco.org/montevideo](http://www.unesco.org/montevideo)